The Implication Doctrine after Touche Ross and Transamerica: The State of Implied Causes of Action in Federal Regulatory Statutes by Spadaro, James J., Jr.
Volume 26 Issue 2 Article 6 
1981 
The Implication Doctrine after Touche Ross and Transamerica: 
The State of Implied Causes of Action in Federal Regulatory 
Statutes 
James J. Spadaro Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James J. Spadaro Jr., The Implication Doctrine after Touche Ross and Transamerica: The State of Implied 
Causes of Action in Federal Regulatory Statutes, 26 Vill. L. Rev. 433 (1981). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1980-81]
Comments
THE IMPLICATION DOCTRINE AFTER TOUCHE ROSS AND
TRANSAMERICA: THE STATE OF IMPLIED CAUSES OF
ACTION IN FEDERAL REGULATORY STATUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the twentieth century, federal courts would not allow a
plaintiff to assert a private cause of action under a federal statute un-
less the legislation expressly provided for such a right.' In Texas &
Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby,2 however, the Supreme Court extended
the consequences of a railroad's violation of the Federal Safety Appliance
Act (FSAA) 3 beyond the penal provisions contained in the statute, to
allow a civil recovery by an injured employee.4
As the implication doctrine evolved, it changed from the statutory-
tort approach used in Rigsby.5 Because many federal statutes are en-
acted to protect some class of persons, such an analysis would give rise
to an implied private action under all such legislation, resulting in a
flood of litigation in the federal courts." This fact, coupled with the
tremendous increase in regulatory legislation in recent years, has acted
1. See Note, Implication of Private Actions from Federal Statutes: From
Borak to Ash, 1 J. Corn,. L. 371, 373 (1976).
2. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). For further discussion of Rigsby, see notes 12-18
and accompanying text infra.
3. Federal Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, §§ 1-16, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (cur-
rent version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1976)).
4. 241 U.S. at 39-40. The parties conceded that the safety standards con-
tained in the Act had not been complied with. Id. at 36.
5. See Note, supra note 1, at 376. The statutory-tort approach involves
examination of three elements: the violation of a federal statute, the injury
resulting from this violation, and whether the injured party is a member of
the class of persons that Congress sought to protect. Id. It should be noted
that the courts do not use the terms "statutory-tort," "statutory-interpretation,"
or "statutory-policy" in their opinions. However, these terms have been widely
accepted in legal literature, and will be useful in the discussion of various
judicial approaches. See id. at 375 n.49.
6. See Comment, Private Rights of Action under Amtrak and Ash: Some
Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392, 1394 (1975). Another
argument against the use of the statutory-tort test is based on the difference
between regulatory legislation and tort law. One commentator has noted
that "[s]ince tort damages are generally compensatory rather than based on the
degree of fault, the implication of a civil remedy may inflict a disproportion-
ate punishment in some cases." See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From
Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARv. L. REv. 285, 291-92 (1963).
(433)
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as a catalyst for the refinement and restriction of the implication
doctrine. 7
This comment will trace the development of the implication doc-
trine; 8 examine recent Supreme Court decisions in the area; 9 examine
the reaction of the lower federal courts to these decisions; 10 and propose
an analysis to be used in future implication cases.11
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUDICIALLY-REcOGNIZED IMPLIED
PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
A. The Implication Doctrine in its Initial Stages - The
Search for a Standard
The Rigsby decision was the first case in which the Supreme Court
recognized the existence of an implied private cause of action arising
from a federal statute.12 There, the Court permitted a railroad em-
ployee who had been injured as a result of his employer's failure to
maintain railroad equipment in the condition required by the FSAA,18
a statute which contained no express civil remedies, 14 to bring his per-
sonal injury claim in federal court.15 The Court reasoned that because
the disregard of the regulatory command of a statute is in itself a wrong-
ful act, a right to recover civil damages is implied in favor of the injured
party.' 6 Thus, the Court concluded that where conduct violative of a
7. See Note, supra note 1, at 388-89.
8. See notes 12-69 and accompanying text infra. It should be noted that
the scope of this comment is limited to cases dealing with federal regulatory
statutes and does not include analysis of implication cases arising under the
federal Constitution. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (private cause of action for damages implied under the
fourth & fourteenth amendments); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)(private cause of action for damages implied under the Due Process Clause of
the fifth amendment).
9. See notes 71-150 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 155-230 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 231-51 and accompanying text infra.
12. See Note, supra note 1, at 373. See also notes 2-7 and accompanying
text supra.
13. Federal Safety Appliance Act, ch. 196, §§ 1-16, 27 Stat. 531 (1893) (cur-
rent version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1976)).
14. 241 U.S. at 37-39.
15. Id. at 39-40.
16. 241 U.S. at 39-40. There are several factors which are relevant to the
Court's use of a statutory-tort approach. First, under the rule of Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and until the Swift doctrine was overruled
by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1933), the federal courts were free to
create standards of care as part of a body of federal common law. See C.
[VOL. 26: p. 433
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federal statute injures a member of the class for whose benefit the statute
was enacted, a federal cause of action may be implied on behalf of the
injured party when the statute does not expressly provide for one.1 7
The Court's analysis was similar to that used in a negligence action,
with the regulatory standards of the FSAA serving as the standard of
care with which the railroad was required to comply.' 8
The Court, in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,19 added as another basis for
implying a private cause of action from a federal statute the effectuating
of the congressional purposes in enacting the statute. There, following
a merger in which stockholder pre-emptive rights were allegedly elimi-
nated,20 the plaintiff brought an action alleging that the merger was
undertaken pursuant to a fraudulent proxy statement 21 and, therefore,
in violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.22
While section 14(a) does not provide an express private cause
of action for damages,23 the Borak Court used a statutory-policy
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 54 (3d ed. 1976). This enabled the Court
to incorporate the statute into its tort analysis, using the statutory violation as
the breach of the duty owed to the plaintiff. 241 U.S. at 39. Second, the
Court found support for the inference of a private action in the language of
the Act which provided that any employee injured by any equipment which
did not comply with the Act would be deemed not to have assumed the risk
of using the faulty equipment. Id. at 40.
17. 241 U.S. at 39-41. The Court justified the recognition of an implied
remedy by reliance on the common law maxim that for every right conferred
by statute, courts should be alert to provide a remedy to protect that right.
Id. at 39-40. This maxim was also the basis for the origin of the implica-
tion doctrine in English law. See Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (Q.B.
1854).
18. See Note, supra note 1, at 376.
19. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
20. Id. at 429. The plaintiff, owner of 2000 shares of J.I. Case Co. stock,
initially brought suit to enjoin the proposed merger of Case with the American
Tractor Company (ATC). Id. at 429. The plaintiff alleged breach of fiduciary
duties by the directors of Case, self-dealing by the management of Case and
ATC and misrepresentation in the material circulated to solicit proxies. Id.
The injunction was denied and the merger was thereafter consummated. Id.
21. Id. at 429-30. The plaintiff alleged that the proxy solicitation mate-
rial was false and misleading, that the merger was approved by a small number
of votes, and that the merger would not have been approved but for the
false and misleading statements in the proxy materials. Id.
22. Id. at 29. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14, 48 Stat.
895 (1934) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976)).
23. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)). Section 14(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility
of a national securities exchange or otherwise to solicit or to per-
mit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authoriza-
tion in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) reg-
istered on any national securities exchange in contravention of such
3
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test 24 to determine whether such a cause of action should be implied. 25 The
Court first examined the legislative history of the section and concluded
that in enacting the section, Congress meant to achieve "broad remedial
purposes." 26 Those purposes, the Court found, included preventing
"management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate
actions by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solici-
tation" and the protection of fair corporate suffrage.2 7 The Court
considered this conclusion to be reinforced by the language of the section
itself, which allowed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
promulgate rules and regulations "for the protection of investors." 28
Because the Court concluded that a private damage action was a
necessary supplement to action by the SEC to assure compliance with
the disclosure provisions of section 14(a), 29 the Court found it appro-
priate to recognize an implied private damage remedy.8 0
A more restrictive approach 31 to the implication of private causes
of action was formulated in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
National Association of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak).3 2 In Amtrak, an
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
24. For a discussion of the statutory-policy test, see Note, supra note 1,
at 378-79. The statutory-policy test requires a court to ascertain, through ex-
press language and legislative history, the congressional purposes for enacting
the statute. Id. The court may imply a private remedy if one is necessary
or appropriate to achieve these purposes. Id. at 378.
25. 377 U.S. at 431-34. The Court based its decision to recognize an
implied private remedy on its desire to give a federal remedy for the violation
of federally-created rights. The Court stated that "it is the duty of courts
to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
Congressional purpose." Id. at 433.
26. Id. at 431-32. The Court relied on a House Report dealing with
the congressional consideration of § 14(a), and noted that the section was in-
tended to control the disclosures made in proxy solicitations "with a view
to preventing the recurrence of abuses which . . . [had] frustrated the free
exercise of the voting rights of stockholders." Id. at 431, quoting H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
27. 377 U.S. at 431.
28. Id. at 432. The Court noted that while the language of § 14(a) made
no specific reference to a private cause of action, the "protection of investors"
language "certainly implies" the existence of such relief. Id.
29. Id. The Court noted that the SEC examines over 2,000 proxy state-
ments each year, and, because of personnel and time limitations, cannot under-
take to verify the truthfulness of the facts set forth in the proxy materials. Id.
30. Id. at 432-33. Because of the practical limitations on enforcement ac-
tions by the SEC, the private damage action, concluded the Court, "serves
as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of proxy requirements." Id.
at 432.
31. See Note, supra note 1, at 380-81.
52. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
[VOL. 26: p. 433
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organization of rail passengers, relying on section 307(a) of the Amtrak
Act,3 3 sought to enjoin the discontinuance of certain passenger routes.3 4
The Court considered its task to be to determine whether Congress
intended to create a private cause of action 35 and acknowledged that
the answer to this question must be found within the language and
legislative history of the statute.3 6 In reviewing the language and his-
tory, the Court noted that Congress expressly rejected an attempt to
amend section 307(a) to include a private cause of action.3 7 Addition-
ally, the Court considered the inclusion of an express private remedy
against the corporation in favor of employees affected by labor disputes
to be further evidence that Congress would have included an express
private cause of action had it intended to include one at all.38 The
33. 45 U.S.C. § 547(a) (1976). The Amtrak Act created a federal rail
passenger corporation to facilitate the maintenance of a "modern, efficient,
inter-city rail passenger service." Id. § 501(a). Section 307(a) of the Amtrak
Act provides in pertinent part:
If the Corporation . . . engages in . . . any action . . . incon-
sistent with the policies and purposes of this chapter . . .. the dis-
trict court of the United States for any district in which the Corpo-
ration or other person resides or may be found shall have jurisdiction,
• * . upon petition of the Attorney General of the United States or,
in a case involving a labor agreement, upon petition of any em-
ployee affected thereby, including duly authorized employee represen-
tatives, to grant such equitable relief as may be necessary or
appropriate to prevent or terminate any violation, conduct or threat.
Id. § 547(a).
34. 414 U.S. at 545. The defendants in the suit were Central Georgia
Railway Co. (Central), its parent, Southern Railway Co. (Southern), and the
National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak). Central had contracted with
Amtrak to assume Central's intercity rail service. After a time, Amtrak an-
nounced the discontinuance of certain of the passenger trains previously oper-
ated by Central. Id. The plaintiff sued to enjoin the discontinuances, claim-
ing that they were prohibited by the Amtrak Act. Id. at 454-55.
35. Id. at 455-56. The Court noted that although the parties had framed
the issues in terms of the availability of an implied private action, federal
court jurisdiction and the plaintiff's standing to sue, the only question to be
considered was whether the Amtrak Act created a cause of action which would
enable a private party to enforce the duties and obligations imposed by the
Act. Id.
36. Id. at 456-57. Because the plaintiff had no basis upon which to rest
his claim other than the Amtrak Act, the Court examined the "four corners"
of the Act to search for evidence of congressional intent to create a private
action in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 456. This search included an examina-
tion of both the language of the Act itself and its legislative history. The
Court's examination of legislative history, however, differed significantly from
that undertaken by the Borak Court. In Borak, the Court used the legislative
history as a vehicle for determining the congressional purposes behind the
enactment of the statute. See notes 19-30 and accompanying text supra. In
Amtrak, the Court focused more narrowly on whether the legislative history
contained any affirmative indication of congressional intent to create a private
action. Id. at 456-61. This focus has been interpreted as being indicative
of the Court's more restrictive attitude toward the recognition of implied
private actions. See Note, supra note 1, at 380-81.
37. 414 U.S. at 458-61.
38. Id. at 457-58. In its discussion of the limited express remedy given in
§ 307(a), the Court relied on the statutory construction principle of expressio
1980-81]
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Court concluded that because neither the language nor legislative his-
tory of the Act evidenced a congressional intent to create an implied
cause of action, it should not recognize such a remedy.3 9
The statutory-interpretation approach used in Amtrak 40 was more
restrictive than the approaches used in the Rigsby 41 and Borak 42 de-
cisions. However, the federal courts were still left without a definitive
standard with which to analyze federal statutes in order to determine
whether they contain an implied remedy.
43
B. The Four-Factor Test of Cort v. Ash
The lack of a definitive standard for federal court recognition of
implied remedies was addressed and temporarily resolved in the land-
mark 1975 decision of Cort v. Ash. 44 In Cort, the plaintiff-stockholder
brought an action for damages against the directors and officers of
Bethlehem Steel Corp. alleging violation of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1974.41 In its analysis, the Court combined 46
unius est exclusio atterius, noting that "[w]hen a statute limits a thing to be
done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode." Id.
at 458, quoting Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929). The
Court concluded that the application of this principle compelled the conclu-
sion that because only a very limited private remedy was expressly given by
Congress, this was intended to be the exclusive means of enforcement of the
duties created by the Act. 414 U.S. at 458. Thus, as one commentator has
noted, the Court showed a great hostility toward the recognition of implied
private actions by creating a presumption against implication. Note, supra
note 1, at 381. This presumption can be rebutted only by "clear contrary
evidence of legislative intent." 414 U.S. at 458.
39. 414 U.S. at 460-61.
40. For a discussion of the statutory-interpretation test, see Note, supra
note 1, at 377-78. The statutory-interpretation approach requires the court to
examine the statutory language and the relevant legislative history to deter-
mine whether Congress intended, without expressly saying so, to give a private
cause of action to the plaintiff. Id. at 377.
41. For a discussion of the Rigsby decision, see notes 12-18 and accom-
panying text supra.
42. For a discussion of the Borak decision, see notes 19-30 and accom-
panying text supra.
43. See Comment, Implying Private Causes of Action From Federal Stat-
utes: Amtrak and Cort Apply the Brakes, 17 B. C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 53,
62-63 (1975).
44. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
45. Id. at 71. The plaintiff, the owner of 50 shares of Bethlehem stock,
alleged that the directors and officers of Bethlehem violated § 610 of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 by authorizing the ex-
penditure of corporate funds for advertisements and mailings relating to the
management's opinion on the issues presented during the 1972 Presidential
election. Id. at 68-72. For the text of the Federal Election Campaign Act see
18 U.S.C. §610 (Supp. III 1974) (repealed 1976).
46. See Note, supra note 1, at 382-88.
[VOL. 26: p. 433
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the statutory-tort,47 the statutory-policy,48 and the statutory-interpreta-
tion 49 approaches which it had used in previous cases 50 and formulated
an analysis based on four factors which it considered to be "relevant" to
the determination of whether a private remedy was to be implied.5 1
The Court stated:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted," . . . that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it con-
sistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? . . . And finally, is
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in
an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law? 52
47. For a discussion of the statutory-tort test, see note 5 and accompanying
text supra.
48. For a discussion of the statutory-policy test, see note 24 and accompany.
ing text supra.
49. For a discussion of the statutory-interpretation test, see note 40 and
accompanying text supra.
50. 422 U.S. at 78. The Court cited the Rigsby decision as support for
the first prong of its four-factor analysis dealing with whether the plaintiff was
an "especial beneficiary" of the statute. Id. For a discussion of the "especial
beneficiary" standard of Rigsby, see notes 12-18 and accompanying text supra.
The Amtrak decision was cited as support for both the second and third fac-
tors in the Cort analysis, dealing with the indication of legislative intent to
create or deny a private remedy and with the consistency of recognizing such
a remedy in relation to the congressional purposes for enacting the statute.
422 U.S. at 78. For a discussion of Amtrak, see notes 32-39 and accompanying
text supra. Finally, the Court discussed both Rigsby and Borak and distin-
guished the result reached in those cases from its decision not to recognize an
implied remedy under § 610. The Court stated that in Borak and Rigsby
"there was at least a statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause of action
of some sort lay in favor of someone. Here, there was nothing more than
a bare criminal statute, with absolutely no indication that civil enforcement
of any kind was available to anyone." 422 U.S. at 79-80. For a discussion of
Borak, see notes 19-30 and accompanying text supra.
51. 422 U.S. at 78.
52. Id. (emphasis by the Court) (citations omitted). It is interesting to
note that in formulating the four-factor test, Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), was incorporated into the fourth factor
of the analysis. 422 U.S. at 78. Bivens was not a case of implication under
a federal statute, but rather, a case of an implied damage remedy under the
fourth amendment to the Constitution. 403 U.S. at 397. The Court's dis-
cussion of Bivens raised a question as to whether the Cort test was to be
applied to future cases seeking implication of constitutionally-based private
remedies. See Note, Bivens Actions for Equal Protection Violations: Davis v.
Passman, 92 HAxv. L. Rav. 745 (1978).
7
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In its application of the first factor, the Court emphasized that the
statute was primarily concerned with keeping the federal election process
free from the possibly corrupting influence of large corporate contribu-
tions. 58 Because the legislation was only secondarily concerned with
the stockholder-corporation relationship,5 4 the Court concluded that cor-
porate stockholders were not the "especial beneficiaries" of the statute.58
In considering the second factor - indications of legislative intent - the
Court undertook an examination of the legislative history of the statute.58
Finding no indication of an affirmative legislative intent to provide a
private remedy, the Court concluded that the second factor also mili-
tated against the recognition of an implied remedy.5 7 Turning to the
third factor, the Court considered the underlying purpose of the legis-
lative scheme - preventing corporate contributions from influencing
federal elections - and concluded that an implied cause of action would
do nothing to cure the evil that the statute was intended to prevent.58
Finally, relying on the availability of state law actions for ultra vires
actions by corporate officers and for breaches of fiduciary duties, the
Court concluded that it was proper to relegate the plaintiff to whatever
remedies he may have at state law.59
The Supreme Court applied the Cort four-factor test in the case of
Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries.60 The Court in Piper considered whether
53. 422 U.S. at 82.
54. Id. The Court noted that "the legislation was primarily concerned
with corporations as a source of aggregated wealth and therefore of possible
corrupting influence, and not directly with the internal relations between the
corporations and their stockholders." Id.
55. Id. The Court emphasized that remedies should only be implied in
situations where there is "a clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff...
or a pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plain-
tiff class and the defendant class in a particular regard." Id.
56. Id. at 82-84. In its examination of the legislative history of § 610, the
Court concluded that there was "no discussion whatever in Congress concern-
ing private enforcement of § 610." Id. at 82 n.14.
57. Id. at 82-84. The Court conceded that while it is often not neces-
sary, in the case of a showing that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary
of the statute, to show an intent to create a private action, an expressed in-
tention to deny one would be controlling. The Court refused to imply a
private remedy, however, without a showing of an affirmative intent to pro-
vide one where it was "at least dubious whether Congress intended to vest
in the plaintiff class rights broader than those provided by state regulation of
corporations . . . . Id. at 82-83.
58. Id. at 84.
59. Id. at 84-85. The Court emphasized that because corporations are
creatures of state law and investors rely on state law to govern the relationship
between the stockholders and the corporation, an implied federal remedy
should be recognized only when the intent of Congress might be frustrated by
state-created causes of action. Because Congress was primarily concerned with
the prevention of corporate influence on federal elections, and not with the
regulation of corporations as such, the Court concluded that leaving the plain-
tiff to his state-created remedies would do nothing to frustrate congressional
intent. Id.
60. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
[VOL. 26: p. 433
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section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 6 provided a de-
feated tender offeror with a private right of action against a successful
takeover bidder.62 The Court, after examining the legislative history
of section 14(e), 3 noted that the "sole purpose" of the Act was to protect
investors,6 4 and concluded that defeated takeover bidders were therefore
not the intended beneficiaries of the statute 65 and could not satisfy the
first of the Cort factors.66 The Court, nevertheless, examined the re-
maining three Cort factors, 7 and determined that these, too, did not
support the implication of a private action.68 Therefore, the Court
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). Section 14(e) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage
in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in con-
nection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or
any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of
any such offer, request, or invitation.
Id.
62. 430 U.S. at 4-9. The plaintiff, Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. (Chris-
Craft), was the unsuccessful tender offeror in a contest for the control of
Piper Aircraft Corp. (Piper). After a protracted battle for control, Bangor
Punta Corp. (Bangor Punta), with the support of the Piper family, secured a
majority of the Piper stock. Id. at 4. Chris-Craft brought suit against Bangor
Punta, the Piper family, and Bangor Punta's underwriter, First Boston
Corp., alleging that certain sales of Piper stock and certain communications
made to Piper stockholders were violative of § 14(e) and SEC Rule lOb-6, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1976). 430 U.S. at 4.
63. 430 U.S. at 26-35. The Court cited extensively to passages from the
hearings and debates surrounding the consideration of § 14(e). Id. From
this examination, the Court concluded that § 14(e) was not designed to favor
either management or the takeover bidder, but was intended solely to require
full and fair disclosure for the benefit and protection of investors. Id. at 31.
64. Id. at 35.
65. Id. The Court found "no hint" in the legislative history that Con-
gress intended either a successful or defeated takeover bidder to have a
private remedy under § 14(e). Id.
66. Id. For a discussion of the Cort four-factor test, see notes 44-59 and
accompanying text supra.
67. 430 U.S. at 38-42. While it gave no indication as to which of the
factors was most important or the relative weight to be given to each factor,
the Piper Court's approach indicated that the absence of the first Cort factor
was not necessarily fatal to the recognition of an implied private remedy under
the four-factor Cort test. See id.
68. Id. at 38-41. In its examination of the second factor, the Court
concluded that the legislative history indicated no express congressional intent
either to grant or to deny a private remedy, but rather evidenced only the
narrow intent to curb unregulated activities by takeover bidders. Id. at 38.
Fairly read, concluded the Court, this narrow declaration of purpose negates
the claim that tender offerors were intended to have a private damage remedy.
Id.
In its examination of the third Cort factor, the Court emphasized that the
purpose of § 14(e) was to protect shareholders. Id. at 39. Because allowing
defeated takeover bidders a private damage remedy may be detrimental to the
protection of the shareholder, the Court concluded that the purposes of the
1980-81]
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declined to recognize an implied private cause of action under section
14(e) of the 1934 Act.69
C. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Restricting the Applicability
of the Cort Test
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court evidence an unwillingness
to continue the pattern of liberal implication of private remedies from
federal statutes. As a result, the four-factor test of Cort has been modi-
fied and restricted at least in its application to statutes which are regu-
latory in nature.70
The first explicit indication that the Court would look less favorably
on the implication doctrine as a theory of relief in federal court 71 came
in Cannon v. University of Chicago.72 Although the four-factor test of
Cort was applied in Cannon, the Court gave warnings that, in the future,
it would not continue to be as liberal in applying the implication
doctrine and that Congress should expressly provide for private remedies
in future statutes if it desired to create them.73
In Cannon, the plaintiff alleged that she had been denied admission
to medical school on the basis of her sex 74 in violation of section 901(a)
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX),75 a federal
civil rights statute which prohibits sex discrimination by certain educa-
tional institutions.70 Although Title IX contains no express private
remedy for violation of its provisions, the plaintiff contended that a
remedy for victims of the proscribed discrimination was to be implied.77
legislative scheme would not be served by the recognition of an implied
damage remedy. Id. at 39-40.
Finally, because the Court determined that the plaintiff would have a
common law cause of action for interference with a prospective commercial
advantage, the Court concluded that it was proper to relegate the plaintiff to
the remedies provided by state law. Id. at 40-41.
69. Id. at 42. After the Piper decision, the Court had several opportuni-
ties to reevaluate the Cort test. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). However, the
Court did not thoroughly analyze the Cort test until its decision in Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). For a discussion of Cannon,
see notes 71-96 and accompanying text infra.
70. See notes 71-150 and accompanying text infra.
71. See Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law,
55 NoTRE DAME LAW. 33, 37 (1979).
72. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
73. See notes 84-96 and accompanying text infra.
74. 441 U.S. at 680.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
76. Title IX provides in part that "no person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
77. 441 U.S. at 683-85.
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The Court, noting the applicability of the Cort analysis, 78 under-
took an extensive analysis of the legislative history of Title JX.79 The
Court observed that Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 80 which, for several years, had been construed by
the federal courts as containing a private remedy.8 ' Furthermore, the
Court noted that Congress had explicitly assumed that Title IX would
be enforced in the same manner as Title V1.S2 Based on these two
factors, the Court concluded that the plain intent of Congress was to
provide a damage remedy for victims of such discrimination so that full
effect could be given to the purpose of the statute. 83
Even though the Cannon Court employed the Cort test,84 the
Cannon decision was less than a whole-hearted endorsement of the Cort
analysis.85 The majority tempered its holding by saying that when
78. Id. at 688-89.
79. Id. at 694-703. In addition to its extensive discussion of the legislative
history of Title IX, the Court also examined the other three factors of the
Cort analysis. In its examination of the first factor, the Court looked to the
language of Title IX, and noted that, unlike the criminal statute considered
in Cort, it explicitly conferred a benefit on a certain class of persons - those
discriminated against on the basis of sex. Id. at 693-94. Further, the plain-
tiff was clearly a member of the class for whose special benefit Congress enacted
the statute. Id. at 694. Thus, the Court concluded that the first factor fa-
vored the implication of a private cause of action. Id. at 693-94.
In examining the third factor, the Court noted that when an implied
remedy is "necessary or at least helpful to the accomplishment of the statutory
purpose, the Court is decidedly receptive to its implication under the statute."
Id. at 703. Because one of the purposes of the statute was to provide individu-
als protection against sex discrimination and because a private cause of action
was consistent with, and necessary to, the effectuation of this purpose, the
Court concluded that the third Cort factor also favored implication. Id. at
704-06.
Finally, because the prohibition of discrimination of any sort, including
that on the basis of sex, is clearly a matter of federal concern, the Court con-
cluded that the fourth Cort factor also favored the implication of a private
federal remedy. Id. at 708-09.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). See 441 U.S. at 694. The Court noted
that, except for the substitution of the word "sex" in Title IX for the words
"race, color, or national origin" in Title VI, the two statutes use identical
language to describe the class of protected persons. Id. at 695. Further, both
statutes provide the same express administrative remedies. Id. at 695-96.
81. 441 U.S. at 694-99. Most particularly, the Court noted that the 1967
case of Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967), had squarely decided that an implied private ac-
tion was contained in Title VI and that this case had been the basis for at
least twelve similar decisions in the federal courts by 1972, when Title IX
was enacted. 441 U.S. at 696.
82. 441 U.S. at 696. The Court pointed to several passages in the Con-
gressional Record in which the supporters of Title IX stated that the cases
construing Title VI would serve as precedent in the enforcement of Title IX.
Id. at 696 n.19. See 118 CONG. R~c. 5807 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh);
117 CONG. Rrc. 30,408 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
83. 441 U.S. at 694-703.
84. Id. at 688-89.
85. See Steinberg, supra note 71, at 37-38.
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Congress intended private litigants to have a cause of action to support
their statutory rights, "the far better course" would be to specifically
state that such a cause of action was being created.8 0 The Court further
pointed out that Title IX presented an atypical situation in that all
four of the Cort factors were satisfied. 7 Finding that this was one of
the "certain limited circumstances" in which an implied private remedy
should be found, the Court allowed the plaintiff to pursue her cause of
action under Title IX.88
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart concurred,89 but noted that the
question of the existence of a private remedy is basically one of statutory
construction. 0 The concurring Justices noted that the attitude of the
Supreme Court toward the recognition of implied causes of action had
become stricter and that the analysis used in the Borak decision is no
longer of practical utility.9 1 The concurrence noted that even though
evidence of congressional intent to provide a private remedy was very
strong in this case, Congress should be explicitly warned that it is "far
better" to be specific when it intends to provide private litigants with a
cause of action.92 Further, in the concurring Justices' view, the Supreme
Court should be "extremely reluctant" to imply a cause of action in
the future without such specificity by the legislature. 93
86. 441 U.S. at 717.
87. Id. It is also important to note that since Cannon involved a civil
rights statute, the Court may have been more willing to imply a private remedy
in favor of the injured plaintiff. For a discussion of the Court's treatment of
cases arising under regulatory statutes, see Transamerica Mortgage Advisers,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560 (1979). See also notes 97-150 and accompanying text infra.
88. 441 U.S. at 717. The Court noted that it had "long recognized that
under certain limited circumstances" the courts may recognize a private cause
of action when Congress fails to expressly provide for one in the statute. Id.
89. Id. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
90. Id. Justice Rehnquist noted that, unlike state courts of general juris-
diction which enforce the common law in conjunction with state statutes,
federal courts which enforce the laws enacted by Congress must look solely to
those laws to determine whether a private cause of action may be brought
under them. Id.
91. Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). justice Rehnquist's impli-
cation was that Borak's analysis is no longer viable insofar as it does not rely
on statutory language and legislative history as indicia of congressional intent
to create a private cause of action. For a discussion of Borak, see notes 19-30
and accompanying text supra. Justice Rehnquist noted that cases like Borak
gave the legislature reason to believe that when it failed to decide the question
of whether a private remedy should be allowed in a statute the Court would
assume the task. Because, in Justice Rehnquist's view, this question is prop-
erly one for the legislature rather than the courts, his statement was a warn-
ing to Congress that the Court would no longer be willing to assume this task.
Id. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
92. 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The concurring justices
also noted that the legislature should be apprised of the fact that "the ball,
so to speak, may well now be in its court." Id.
93. Id.
[VOL. 26: p. 433
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Justice Powell dissented,94 warning against the continued use of the
Cort test.95 He noted that the four-factor analysis is an invitation to
federal courts to legislate causes of action not authorized by Congress -
a course of action which would, in his view, violate the constitutional
principle of separation of powers.96
The Court further limited the utility of the implication doctrine
by considering only the first two of the Cort factors in Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington.9T In Touche Ross, an action was brought against the
defendant public accounting firm 98 by the plaintiff, trustee in bank-
ruptcy of Weis Securities, Inc. (Weis), 99 alleging that the defendant
breached duties owed to the customers of Weis and others under
section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 100 by
94. Id. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting). justice Powell indicated that the
Cort analysis was a product of a "more or less haphazard line of cases", was
not faithful to constitutional principles, and should, therefore, be rejected. Id.
Justice Powell maintained that absent the "most compelling evidence of affirma-
tive congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of
action." Id. Further, the Cort test "too easily may be used to deflect in-
quiry away from the intent of Congress, and to permit a court instead to sub-
stitute its own views as to the desirability of private enforcement." Id. at 740
(Powell, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated that the
decision in Cannon illustrates how the implication of a private right of action
"denigrates the democratic process." Id. at 747 (Powell, I., dissenting). Be-
cause the decision will, in justice Powell's view, put a burden of expensive
and vexatious litigation on many of the nation's educational institutions, he
feared that the institutions would alter their admissions processes making
them less flexible. Id. at 747-48 (Powell, J., dissenting). Such a significant
intrusion into the liberty of academic institutions, justice Powell opined,
should be a decision made by Congress rather than the courts. Id. at 748
(Powell, J., dissenting).
97. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
98. Id. at 563. Touche Ross was retained as the independent auditor
for Weis Securities, Inc. from 1969 to 1973. Id. While engaged in this ca-
pacity, Touche Ross conducted annual audits of Weis' books and records and
prepared for filing with the SEC all reports of Weis' financial condition as
required by § 17(a) of the 1934 Act. Id. For the text of § 17(a), see note
100 infra.
99. 442 U.S. at 564-66. In 1973, the SEC and the New York Stock Ex-
change discovered that the financial condition of Weis was far worse than the
reports prepared by Touche Ross indicated. Id. at 564. After a United
States District Court adjudged Weis' customers in need of the protection
afforded by the Securities Investors Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-
78111 (1976), it appointed Redington as trustee and ordered the liquidation of
Weis' assets. Id. at 564-65. Thereafter, pursuant to the statutory authority
granted to it under SIPA, the Securities Investor Protective Corp. (SIPC) ad-
vanced $14 million to the Trustee in order to reimburse Weis' customers up
to the specified statutory limits. Id. Even after this advance, however, over
$51 million in customer claims remained unsatisfied. Id. at 565 n.6.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976). In 1972, the date relevant to this case,
§ 17(a) provided:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every
broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities through the
medium of any such member, every registered securities association,
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conducting an improper audit and certification of Weis' 1972 financial
statements. 101
The Court began its analysis by emphasizing that the issue of im-
plication is a question of statutory construction - i.e., a determination
of congressional intent.102 In its examination of section 17(a), the
majority first reviewed the language of the statute 103 and observed that
it neither outlaws any conduct nor creates a private right of action in
favor of anyone.'0 4 The Court noted that in cases in which it had
recognized implied private causes of action, the statutes in question at
least prohibited certain conduct or created federal rights in favor of
private parties, 05
and every broker or dealer registered pursuant to section 78o of this
title, shall make, keep, and preserve for such periods, such accounts,
correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other records, and
make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and regulations
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors. Such accounts, correspondence, memo-
randa, papers, books and other records shall be subject at any time
or from time to time to such reasonable periodic, special, or other
examinations by examiners or other representatives of the Commis-
sion as the Commission may deem necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 677, § 5, 52 Stat. 1076 (1938) (amended
1975) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976)).
101. 442 U.S. at 565-66. The complaint was filed by both the trustee in
liquidation and the SIPC, which sued on its own behalf and as the subrogee
of Weis' customers whose claims it paid under SIPA. Id. at 566. In addi-
tion to the § 17(a) claim, the complaint also alleged breach of duties owed to
the trustee and SIPC under state law, including negligence, breach of con-
tract and breach of warranty. Id. The complaint further averred that Touche
Ross' breach of duty prevented disclosure of Weis' dire financial condition
until it was too late to take whatever remedial action could be taken to avoid
or lessen the adverse financial consequences suffered by Weis' customers. Id.
102. Id. at 568. Therefore, the Court noted, the SIPC's argument in
favor of implication based on tort principles was "entirely misplaced." Id.
103. Id. at 568-89.
104. Id. The Court went on to note that the express intent of § 17(a)
was to provide the SEC with the necessary information to ensure compliance
with the "net capital rule," the principal regulatory tool used by the SEC
to protect customers who leave assets on deposit with broker-dealers. Id. at
569-70. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1978). Accordingly,
the Court concluded that as § 17(a) is forward-looking and seeks to forestall
broker insolvency rather than to serve as a compensatory mechanism to be
used after insolvency has occurred, the language of the statute gives no basis
for inferring a private cause of action. 442 U.S. at 570-71.
105. 442 U.S. at 569, citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677 (1979) (§ 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454
(1975) (§ 1981 of Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)); Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (§ 10(b) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1976)); Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (§ 1982 of Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1976)); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (§ 5 of Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973C (1976)); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964) (§ 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1976)). For a discussion of Borak, see notes 19-30 and accompanying text
446
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The Court next considered the legislative history of section 17(a) 106
and found it to be silent on the question of whether Congress intended
a private remedy to be available. 107 Rejecting an argument that, in the
absence of an express congressional intent to deny a private cause of
action, one should be inferred, 108 the Court drew further support for
its decision from the structure of the statute.109
After this analysis, which encompassed only the first and second
Cort factors, the majority concluded that no further inquiry was neces-
sary.1 0 While recognizing that Cort had established that four factors
were "relevant" to the determination of whether a cause of action may
be implied in a federal statute,"' the Touche Ross Court noted that
the Cort decision had not said that each factor was to be given equal
weight."12 Given its task of determining congressional intent, the Court
concluded that in a case where the statutory language neither confers
private rights nor proscribes conduct and the legislative history is silent
supra. For a discussion of Cannon, see notes 70-96 and accompanying text
supra.
106. 442 U.S. at 571.
107. Id. The Court noted several House and Senate Reports which indi-
cated that § 17(a) was intended only as a preventative monitoring provision
and not to provide customers an action for losses after liquidation. Id. at
571 n.17. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 21 (1934); H.R. REP.
No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1934).
108. 442 U.S. at 571. The Court noted that recognizing an implied cause
of action based on congressional silence was a "hazardous enterprise at best."
Id.
The Court further stated that where "the plain language of the provision
weighs against implication of a private remedy, the fact that there is no sug-
gestion whatsoever in the legislative history that § 17(a) may give rise to suits
for damages reinforces our decision not to find such a right of action implicit
within the section." Id. (citations omitted).
Further, the Court went on to note that § 18(a) of the Act provides an
express damage remedy for certain persons harmed by materially misleading
statements made in reports required by § 17(a). Id. at 572. See also 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(a) (1976). The Court declined to imply a much broader remedy than
that which it concluded Congress chose to provide. 442 U.S. at 572.
109. 442 U.S. at 571-72. The Court emphasized that there are many sec-
tions of the 1934 Act in which private rights of action are explicitly granted,
among them § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1976), and § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976). 442 U.S. at 571-72. To the Court,
this indicated that when Congress wanted to provide a private right of action,
it knew how to do so and did so expressly. Id. at 572.
110. 442 U.S. at 576.
111. Id. at 575-76. See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
112. 442 U.S. at 575. The Court noted that further inquiry was un-
necessary since the question of whether Congress, either expressly or by im-
plication, intended to create a private cause of action had definitely been
answered in the negative. Id. at 576.
The Court also rejected the argument that a private remedy should be
implied based on a broad invocation of the "remedial purposes" of the 1934
Act. Id. at 578. See also SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978).
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as to private remedies, there is no need for further inquiry 213 and a
cause of action is not to be implied.114
The restrictive trend against the implication of private rights of
action continued in Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis,11
in which the Court was faced with the issue of whether an implied
private remedy existed under sections 206 and 215 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (Act).116 In Transamerica, the plaintiff, a share-
holder in a trust of which the defendant, Transamerica Mortgage
Advisers, Inc., (TAMA) was an investment adviser," 7 brought suit based
on allegations that the defendant had committed various frauds and
breaches of fiduciary duty.11s The complaint set forth several claims
said to arise under the Act,"19 on the theory that the clients of invest-
ment advisers were the intended beneficiaries of the Act and, therefore,
that an implied private cause of action in their favor should be recog-
nized.120
The Court began its analysis by again emphasizing that the ques-
tion of whether a statute contains an implied private right of action is
one of statutory construction 121 and that the ultimate determination to
be made is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy as-
serted.' 2 2 The Court cited Touche Ross for the proposition that the
113. 442 U.S. at 576.
114. Id.
115. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1976).
117. 444 U.S. at 13. The suit was brought both as a derivative action on
behalf of the trust and as a class action on behalf of the trust's shareholders.
Id. Also named as defendants were the trust, several individual trustees, and
two corporate affiliates of TAMA. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 13-14. The complaint set out three causes of action. The first
alleged that the investment advisers' contract was unlawful because of failure
to register and because the contract called for excessive compensation. Id. at
13. The second alleged a breach of fiduciary duty based on the purchase by
the trust of low-quality securities. Id. The third alleged that profitable in-
vestment opportunities had been diverted from the trust to affiliates of Trans-
america. Id. at 13-14.
120. Id. at 14-15. The Court noted that the Act nowhere expressly pro-
vides for a private cause of action. Id. at 14. The only section of the Act
which gives any authorization to bring suit is § 209, which gives the SEC power
to seek an injunction in federal court to enjoin violations of the Act. 444
U.S. at 14. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976).
121. 444 U.S. at 15.
122. Id. at 15-16. The court emphasized that while some earlier opinions,
such as Borak, had placed "considerable emphasis upon the desirability of
implying private rights of action in order to effectuate the purposes of a given
statute. . . . what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress in-
tended to create a private remedy." Id. at 15. For a discussion of Borak, see
notes 19-30 and accompanying text supra. The court cited Touche Ross as
support for the assertion that recent decisions had made clear that congres-
sional intent was the relevant inquiry in deciding whether to recognize an
implied action. 444 U.S. at 16. For a discussion of Touche Ross, see notes
97-114 and accompanying text supra.
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first factor relevant to this determination is the language of the statute
itself 123 and, accordingly, examined the language of both sections 206
and 215.124 From its examination of the express language of section
215, the, Court concluded that Congress intended to create a private
cause of action. 25 The Court reasoned that by expressly declaring
certain types of contracts to be "void," Congress obviously intended
that the issue of voidness should become part of the federal remedy
under section 215, and so recognized the existence of a private cause of
action in favor of the trust seeking to void the investment adviser's
contract.126
The Court took a different view, however, of the plaintiff's claims
under section 206.127 Because, unlike section 215, section 206 simply
proscribed certain conduct and did not by its terms create or alter any
civil liabilities, the Court concluded that if a private right of action
was to be found in section 206, it must be read into the section.128
However, the Court noted that it is an elemental canon of statutory
construction that "where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy
or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it." 129 Read-
123. 444 U.S. at 16.
124. Id. at 16-17. Section 206 is a broad proscription against fraudulent
practices by investment advisers, and makes it unlawful for any investment
adviser to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . [or] to en-
gage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a
fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client," or to engage in certain
specified transactions with clients without making required disclosures. Id. at
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
Section 215 provides that contracts whose formation or performance would
result in a violation of the Act "shall be void . . . as regards the rights of"
the violator and knowing successors in interest. 444 U.S. at 16-17. See 15
U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976).
125. 444 U.S. at 19. The Court also examined the legislative history of
the Act, and found it to be silent on the question of the existence of an im-
plied private remedy. Id. The Court noted that while the absence in the
legislative history of anything which indicates an intention to create a private
cause of action was not helpful to the plaintiff's claim, it did not automatically
undermine his position, as prior cases had established that the failure of
Congress to consider a private remedy is not inevitably inconsistent with an
intent to make such a remedy available. Id. Such an intent, said the Court,
"may appear implicitly in the language or structure of the statute, or in the
circumstances of its enactment." Id.
126. Id. at 19. In dealing with the assertion that Congress might have
intended that the issue of voidness should be litigated in state court, the Court
noted that "we decline to adopt such an anomalous construction without some
indication that Congress in fact wished to remit the litigation of a federal
right to the state courts." Id. at 19 n.8.
127. Id. at 19.
128. Id. Unlike § 215, which expressly declares certain contracts to be
"void", § 206 is simply a broad proscription against fraudulent practices by
investment advisers. For a discussion of the language of the sections, see note
124 supra.
129. 444 U.S. at 19. The Court noted that "[w]hen a statute limits a
thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other
1980-81]
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ing section 206 in the overall context of the statute, 8 0 the Court noted
that Congress provided express judicial and administrative remedies for
violation of section 206.131 In view of those express remedies, the Court
found it "highly improbable that 'Congress absent-mindedly forgot to
mention an implied private action."' 182
The Court went on to note that even established canons of statutory
construction must yield to persuasive evidence of congressional intent
to provide a private remedy.133 In its search for such evidence, the
Court noted that in each of the securities statutes enacted prior to, or as
a companion statute with the Act, Congress had expressly granted pri-
vate damage actions in certain prescribed circumstances. 34 Because this
established that Congress knew how to provide a private remedy when
it wanted one to exist,"35 the fact that there was no express damage
provision in the statute in issue strongly suggested to the Court that
Congress was unwilling to provide a private cause of action for dam-
ages." 0e
Next, the Court examined the relationship of an implied cause of
action under section 206 and the Cort four-factor analysis."37 In reject.
mode." Id. at 20, quoting Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289
(1929).
130. 444 U.S. at 20.
131. Id. The Court noted three specific express remedies for violations of
§206. First, §217, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1976), is a criminal provision which
provides for fines or imprisonment for willful violations of the Act. 444 U.S.
at 20. Second, § 209, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9 (1976), gives an express civil remedy
to the SEC to enjoin compliance with the Act. 444 U.S. at 20. Third, § 203,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1976), allows the SEC to impose various administrative sanc-
tions on persons who violate the Act. 444 U.S. at 20.
132. 444 U.S. at 20, quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting). See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
at 572 ("When Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it knew
how to do so and did so expressly.")
133. 444 U.S. at 20.
134. Id. at 20-21. Specifically, the Court noted the existence of express
private damage actions in sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77k & 771 (1976); sections 9(e), 16(b) and 18 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b) 8c 78r (1976); sections 16(a) and
17(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79p(a)
& 79q(b) (1976); section 323(a) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77www(a) (1976) and section 30(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940,
15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1976). 444 U.S. at 20 n.10.
135. 444 U.S. at 21. The Court observed that "when Congress wished to
provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly."
Id., quoting Touche Ross 9: Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 572. See note 109
supra.
136. 444 U.S. at 21. The Court further noted that the omission of an ex-
press private damage action from the substantive provisions of the Act was
paralleled by the jurisdictional section, § 214, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1976). 444
U.S. at 21. During the course of its consideration, all references to federal
court jurisdiction over "actions at law" to enforce any "liability" created under
the Act were deleted. Id. at 20-21.
137. 444 U.S. at 23-24. For a discussion of the Cort decision, see notes
44-59 and accompanying text supra.
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ing the assertion of the dissent 138 that the straightforward application
of the Cort analysis favored implication, 39 the majority emphasized
that the Touche Ross decision 140 counselled against the examination
of any factor which is not indicative of congressional intent. 41 Be-
cause its examination of the language and legislative history of section
206 had led to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to create a
private damage remedy,142 the Court declined to consider the utility of
a private remedy and the fact that the area may not be one traditionally
relegated to state law,143 and considered its inquiry at an end. 4 4
In its examination of section 206, the Court exhibited a stricter
attitude toward the implication of private remedies than had been illus-
trated even in the narrow analysis undertaken in Touche Ross, 145 where
the Court focused on the fact that the statute neither granted private
rights to any class of persons nor proscribed any conduct as unlawful.146
138. 444 U.S. at 26-27. (White, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice White filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined.
Id. at 25-36 (White, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 26-36 (White, J., dissenting). An important aspect of the
analysis used by the dissent was its discussion of the relationship between §§ 206
and 215. Id. at 29 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White asserted that § 215
was meant only to specify one of the consequences of a violation of § 206 or
other substantive provisions, namely that a violative contract would be de-
clared void. Id. Believing there to be a practical necessity of a private
remedy to enforce this particular consequence of a § 206 violation, the dissent
concluded that Congress contemplated the use of private actions to give
other forms of relief for violations of § 206 and that Congress did not intend
the express administrative and judicial remedies provided in the Act to be
exclusive. Id.
140. For a discussion of the Touche Ross decision, see notes 94-114 and
accompanying text supra.
141. 444 U.S. at 23. In particular, the Court noted that in Touche Ross,
the Court had refused to consider the utility of a private remedy and the
fact that it may be one not traditionally relegated to state law, in circum-
stances where the intent of Congress to create a private action could not be
discerned from an examination of statutory language and legislative history. Id.
142. Id. at 15-22. See notes 127-36 and accompanying text supra.
143. 444 U.S. at 23. Justice White, in dissent, noted that the majority re-
fused to consider the third and fourth prongs of the Cort test because they were
ignored in Touche Ross. Id. at 34 n.10 (White, J., dissenting). He asserted,
however, that the Touche Ross Court refused to consider these factors only
because the first two prongs of the test had not been satisfied. Id. By con-
trast, the majority conceded that under § 206, the clients of investment ad-
visers were the intended beneficiaries of the statute, and so at least the first
prong of the Cort test was satisfied. Id.
144. Id. at 24. Mr. Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion in which
he stated that he viewed the decision as compatible with the views expressed
in his dissent in Cannon. Id. at 25 (Powell, J., concurring). Therefore, in
Justice Powell's view, a court may imply a cause of action only when it finds
,most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent." See Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting); note 95
supra.145. For a discussion of the Touche Ross decision, see notes 97-114 and
accompanying text supra.
146. 444 U.S. at 24. See note 113 and accompanying text supra.
1980-81]
19
Spadaro: The Implication Doctrine after Touche Ross and Transamerica: The
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1981
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In that situation, it was "evident" to the Court that no implied private
damage remedy should be recognized. 147 In contrast, the Court con-
ceded that section 206 clearly prohibited certain conduct by investment
advisers 148 and further, that it was intended to protect the victims of
the proscribed practices.'49 The Court, however, refused to recognize
an implied private cause of action, noting that "the mere fact that the
statute was designed to protect advisers' clients does not require the
implication of a private cause of action for damages on their behalf." 150
III. REACTIONS TO THE RESTRCTIVE TREND OF THE SUPREME COURT
RECENT IMPLICATION CASES IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
The reaction in the lower federal courts to the Touche Ross and
Transamerica decisions has been far from uniform. As will be seen in
the discussion of the cases which follow, while commonly acknowledg-
ing that the task of the court is the determination of congressional
intent to create a private cause of action,' 5' some of the courts of appeals
have followed the Supreme Court's lead, adopting a restrictive attitude
toward both the recognition of implied causes of action and the viability
of the Cort test; 152 but others continue to buck the apparent trend, re-
taining a more liberal attitude and have either adopted a narrow view
of the impact of Touche Ross and Transamerica on the Cort test, 53 or
have apparently ignored or misapplied these decisions. 54
147. 444 U.S. at 24.
148. Id. See note 124 supra.
149. 444 U.S. at 24.
150. Id. Thus, it is submitted that the Transamerica decision indicates
a broad-based rejection of the four-factor analysis used in Cort, as the Trans-
america Court refused to consider the last two factors of the Cort test even
where the statute protected an identifiable class and proscribed conduct. In
Touche Ross, it was the absence of these two elements which formed the basis
for the Court's refusal to consider the third and fourth Cort factors. See note
113 and accompanying text supra. More recently, the Supreme Court has
confirmed the vitality of the analyses used in Touche Ross and Transamerica
in Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136,
148-49 (1980). See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 39 n.5 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
151. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 302 (2d Cir. 1980), discussed at
notes 198-210 and accompanying text infra; Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking &
Trust Co., 623 F.2d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 1980), discussed at notes 211-19 and
accompanying text infra; Bratton v. Shiffrin, 15 Av. Cas. 18,076, 18,078 (7th
Cir. 1980), discussed at notes 220-25 and accompanying text infra; CETA
Workers' Organizing Comm. v. City of New York, 617 F.2d 926, 932 (2d Cir.
1980), discussed at notes 181-90 and accompanying text infra; Jablon v. Dean
Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1980), discussed at notes 165-80 and
accompanying text infra; Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1078 & n.4(5th Cir. 1980), discussed at notes 155-69 and accompanying text infra; Taylor
v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256, 258-59 (6th Cir. 1980), discussed at notes
191-97 and accompanying text infra; Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d 389, 394
(6th Cir. 1980), discussed at notes 226-30 and accompanying text infra.
152. See notes 155-97 and accompanying text infra.
153. See notes 198-219 and accompanying text infra.
154. See notes 220-30 and accompanying text infra.
[VOL. 26: p. 433
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss2/6
COMMENTS
A. Decisions of the Courts of Appeals Reflecting the
Restrictive Trend
The Fifth Circuit followed the lead of the Supreme Court in taking
a restrictive stance toward the recognition of implied actions in the case
of Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.155 The Rogers court was faced with the
issue of the implication of a cause of action from section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,151 which requires most government contracts
to contain an agreement by the contractor to create and maintain
affirmative action programs for the handicapped. 157 The statute also
permits any handicapped person to file a complaint with the Secretary
of Labor if that person believes that a government contractor has failed
to comply with the agreement.6 8 The plaintiffs in Rogers, handicapped
former employees of the defendant, brought an action in federal court
asserting that a private cause of action for damages was implicit in
section 503.159
The Rogers court refused to engage in a mechanical application of
the Cort four-factor test 160 and emphasized that the heart of the issue was
a determination of whether Congress intended to create a private cause of
action. 1 1 Looking exclusively at the language of the statute and its
legislative history, 6 2 the court concluded that inasmuch as neither factor
155. 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976). Section 503(a) requires that any contract en-
tered into by the federal government in excess of $2,500 contain a provision
that the contracting parties will institute and maintain an affirmative action
program to employ certain qualified handicapped individuals. Id. § 793(a).
Section 503(b) provides that handicapped individuals who allege that the
parties have failed to comply with the affirmative action covenant in the con-
tract may file a complaint with the Department of Labor. Id. § 793(b).
157. 611 F.2d at 1077.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976). Upon receipt of such a complaint, the
Secretary is required to make a prompt investigation and to take whatever
action is warranted by the facts and circumstances, consistent with the terms
of the contract and the laws and regulations applicable thereto. Id.
159. 611 F.2d at 1077-78 c nn.2 & 3. The plaintiffs did not request that a
private right of action be inferred in order to force the inclusion of an affirma-
tive action program into the contract, but to provide a remedy against fed-
eral contractors who they claim discriminated against the handicapped. Id.
at 1078 n.3.
160. Id. at 1078. The court noted that mechanical adherence to Cort
should not replace the "judgmental wisdom that is sought from courts." Id.
161. Id. at 1078 9c n.4. See also Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 234
(3d Cir. 1980) (the Cort factors are useful only as "guideposts" for determining
legislative intent).
162. See 611 F.2d at 1079-85. In its analysis, the Rogers court used the
statutory language to determine: 1) if the plaintiff was a member of the
class upon which Congress sought to confer federal rights and 2) whether a
private remedy is consistent with the purposes of the statutory scheme as a
whole. Id. Legislative history was examined in order to find any indication
of congressional intent to allow private relief. See id. The court concluded
that neither factor supported the plaintiff's claim for damages. Id. However,
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provided a positive indication of congressional intent to create a private
damage remedy, 0 3 the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims was proper.
0 4
The Ninth Circuit, in Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., l o5 adopted the
modified test of Touche Ross and Transamerica as the new guidepost to
be used in determining whether to imply a private cause of action. 6
In Jablon, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant participated in vari-
ous frauds relating to her margin account.167 The plaintiff contended
it is important to note that by examining the overall statutory scheme - the
third factor of the Cort analysis - the Rogers court departed from the nar-
rower analyses of Touche Ross and Transamerica, which used statutory lan-
guage for the sole purpose of determining whether Congress intended to confer
federal rights on the plaintiff. For a discussion of Touche Ross and Trans-
america, see notes 97-150 and accompanying text supra. See also Simpson v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1237-44 (7th Cir. 1980) (section 503 con-
tains no private remedy, either for damages or for an injunction to force
compliance with the terms of the contract). It is also important to note that
in its examination of statutory language, the Rogers court departed from the
first factor of the Cort analysis in a very important way. The Rogers court
gave no weight to the assertion that the plaintiff was arguably a member of the
class Congress sought to protect - an "intended beneficiary" of the statute.
611 F.2d at 1079. Rather, the court framed the issue as being whether Con-
gress intended to confer federal rights on the class. Id. at 1079-80.
163. 611 F.2d at 1085. The Rogers court noted that when asked to imply
a remedy where Congress has made no mention of one, the judiciary should be
careful to "resort neither to our own notions of sound policy nor to our
concept of what best suits the public weal." Id. The court noted that Con-
gress may have been silent as to the existence of a private cause of action for
many reasons, all of them inconsistent with the implication of a private remedy:
1) a private remedy never occurred to Congress; 2) congressional oversight in
failing to deal with a matter intended to be covered; and 3) deliberate ob-
scurity for political reasons. Id. The proper inquiry, the court noted, is
not whether the advocates of judicially-implied remedies have a better case
than their opponents, "but whether, considering the purpose and function of
the statute and its legislative history, we can find a legislative intent to recog-
nize a judicial remedy." Id.
164. Id. In dissent, Judge Goldberg noted that "[o]nly a cave dweller or
other layman would not realize that there has been a remarkable change of
attitude by the Supreme Court regarding the inference of private rights of
action in the last fifteen years." Id. at 1088 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). How-
ever, he disagreed that the recent Supreme Court decisions should have such
a limiting effect on the Cort test. Id. at 1108 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Judge
Goldberg noted: "Recent Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that
private remedies are not lightly to be inferred. The majority, I fear, has over-
reacted to these words of caution and, instead of vindicating the congressional
purpose, defeat it. Their approach would, in my opinion, reduce Cort to
ashes." Id.
165. 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980).
166. Id. at 679.
167. Id. at 678-79. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that an account execu-
tive at Dean Witter urged her to open a margin account without inquiring
into her financial position, business expertise, or investment goals; that she
was not advised that she could close her margin account at any time and
thereby avoid the payment of interest and the payment of additional funds to
meet margin calls; and that her account executive improperly recommended
that she purchase several highly speculative securities on margin. Id. at 678.
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that section 6(b) of the 1934 Act,168 which requires that exchanges adopt
rules promoting "just and equitable principles of trade," 169 provided
the statutory basis for her claim on the theory that Congress intended
to delegate to the exchanges the authority to establish rules from which
a private right of action may be implied.17° The plaintiff claimed that
the rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)171 were drafted in such a way
that an implied right of action in her favor could legitimately be
recognized.172
In its examination of section 6(b), the court noted that the proper
standard for implying private rights of action was the determination of
legislative intent. 73 This, the court opined, was best accomplished
through statutory construction as evidenced by Touche Ross and Trans-
america.174 Accordingly, relying on the Court's analysis in Touche Ross,
the court refused to recognize an implied private cause of action 175
168. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976). Section 6(b) provides:
No registration shall be granted or remain in force unless the rules of
the exchange include provision for the expulsion, suspension, or
disciplining of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade, and declare that the willful
violation of any provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder shall be considered conduct or proceeding inconsistent
with just and equitable principles of trade.
Id.
169. 614 F.2d at 679-80. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1976); note 168 supra.
170. 614 F.2d at 679.
171. Id. at 678. Specifically, the plaintiff's claims were under NYSE Rule
405, the "know your customer" rule, which requires that securities dealers use
due diligence to ascertain the essential facts relating to every customer they
service, every order they process and every cash or margin account they carry.
See id. at 678 n.l. A claim was also made under section 2 of the NASD rules,
the "suitability rule," which requires that a securities dealer, when recom-
mending the purchase or sale of a security to a customer, have reasonable
rounds to believe that the recommendation is suitable for the customer. See
id. at 678 n.2.
172. Id. at 679. Because the court concluded, in its analysis of the first
step of the plaintiff's claim, that Congress did not intend to create private
rights of action for violation of stock exchange rules, the court did not decide
the merits of the second step of the plaintiff's claim. Id.
173. Id. at 680.
174. Id. at 679. These decisions, the court stated, "reflect a restrictive ap-
proach to implying private causes of action [which] . . . should apply in this
case." Id. It is interesting to note that Cort was nowhere mentioned in the
Jablon decision.
175. Id. at 680. The court rejected a claim based on § 27 of the Act,
as it is simply jurisdictional and creates no rights on its own. Id. at 679-81.
This was the same analysis of § 27 used by the Supreme Court in Touche Ross.
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 577.
What makes this decision all the more significant is the fact that several
courts and commentators had previously concluded that implied private causes
of action should be recognized for exchange rule violations under §§ 6(b)
and 27 of the Act. See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Geyer v. Paine,
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because section 6(b) "neither confers rights on private parties nor pro-
scribes any conduct as unlawful." 170 Similarly, both Touche Ross and
Transamerica were cited as support for rejecting the argument that an
implied cause of action should be recognized because of the broad
remedial purposes of the 1934 Act and a general congressional purpose
to protect the public. 7 7
As "further support" for its conclusions, the court noted the express
private remedies provided by other sections of the Act.178 This was
cited as evidence that Congress knew how to provide a damage remedy
when it wanted to 179 and that it was highly unlikely that "Congress
absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action." 180
The Second Circuit showed its agreement with the Jablon decision
in CETA Workers' Organizing Committee v. City of New York.181
There, the Second Circuit was faced with the question of whether the
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) 182 contained an
implied private remedy in favor of individual program participants
against recipients of federal funds under CETA work programs. 8 3 The
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975); Lowenfels,
Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
12, 16-17 (1966).
176. 614 F.2d at 680, quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
at 569. See also Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 509 (lst Cir. 1979)
(reading Touche Ross as proscribing implication where the statute neither
creates federal rights nor proscribes conduct); note 89 and accompanying text
supra. But see Cedar-Riverside Assoc., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 606 F.2d
254, 258 (8th Cir. 1979).
177. 614 F.2d at 680-81. The Court pointed out that in Touche Ross, a
public protection argument was rejected because "the mere fact that [a statute]
was designed to provide protection for brokers' customers does not require the
implication of a damage action on their behalf." Id. at 680, quoting Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 578.
Similarly, the court noted that the Transamerica Court had rejected a
public protection argument in almost identical terms, stating "the mere fact
that the statute was designed to protect advisers' clients does not require the
implication of a private cause of action for damages on their behalf." 614
F.2d at 680, quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
at 24.
178. 614 F.2d at 181. Express private damage remedies are provided to
investors under sections 9(e), 16(b) and 18 of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e),
78p(b) & 78r (1976).
179. 614 F.2d at 181. See note 135 and accompanying text supra. For a
discussion of the possible reasons for congressional omission of a private cause
of action, see note 163 supra.
180. 614 F.2d at 681, citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. at 20, quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 742
(Powell, J., dissenting).
181. 617 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1980).
182. 29 U.S.C. §§ 801-999 (Supp. 1979). CETA is designed to provide
federal funds to local sponsors of work programs, to be used to provide job
training and employment opportunities for economically disadvantaged, un-
employed and underemployed persons. See id. § 801.
183. 617 F.2d at 928-29. The plaintiffs' principal claim was that they
had not received adequate training, counseling or services while participants
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court, although questioning the validity of exclusive reliance on the
four-factor Cort analysis,184 expressed the view that the Cort test was a
"useful guide" for determining congressional intent in the absence of
explicit statutory language or legislative history. 185 The court also noted
that while Touche Ross and Transamerica did not overrule decisions
such as Borak in which implied causes of action were found to exist,186
the more recent cases were a message to Congress and the lower courts
that "in future statutory drafting, more explicitness will be required.
• ' 187
In its examination of CETA, the court noted that individual pro-
gram participants were arguably members of the class Congress intended
to protect.'8 8 Even though this first prong of the Cort test had been
satisfied, the court concluded that, in view of the complex and compre-
hensive scheme of administrative remedies expressly provided private
in a CETA work program because the local sponsors had unlawfully allo-
cated insufficient funds for these purposes, in alleged violation of sections
232(b)(2), 603(a) and 605(c) of the Act. Id. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 854(b)(2), 963(a)
& 965(c) (1976). The failure to provide training was also alleged to violate
sections 201, 205(c)(4), 602(a) and 602(c) of the Act. 617 F.2d at 928. See
29 U.S.C. §§ 841, 845(c)(4), 962(a) & 962(c) (1976).
The plaintiffs also claimed that an express right of action was created by§ 106(1) of the Act. 617 F.2d at 928. See 29 U.S.C. § 816(1) (1976). The court
rejected this claim, noting that § 106(1) was designed to be a part of a com-
prehensive and complex system of administrative enforcement of CETA and
to preserve all rights created by the Act, rather than to create new ones. 617
F.2d at 931. The court concluded that the most that could be said about
§ 106(1) was that if an implied private cause of action was recognized else-
where in the statute, § 106(1) would not stand in the way of its assertion. Id.
184. 617 F.2d at 932 n.2. The court noted that the decisions in Trans.
america, Touche Ross and Amtrak counsel that a court should not "look ab-
stractly at the 'desirability' of inferring private rights of action thought by us
to provide remedies effectuating the purposes of the given statute," and should
thus use the tools of statutory construction to examine the statute and discern
congressional intent. Id. at 932 (emphasis by the court). See also Guardians
Ass'n of the New York City Police Dept. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d
232, 258-59 (2d Cir. 1980).
185. 617 F.2d at 932. In so framing their analysis, the court appears con-
sistent with the Touche Ross formulation - negative congressional intent is
conclusively shown where the legislative history is silent and where the clear
language of the statute neither confers rights on private parties nor proscribes
any conduct as unlawful. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at
569. See also Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dept. v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232, 258-59 (2d Cir. 1980); note 104 and accompanying
text supra.
186. 617 F.2d at 932 n.3. For a discussion of Borak, see notes 19-30 and
accompanying text supra.
187. 617 F.2d at 932 n.3.
188. Id. at 932-33. The court observed that it is often easier to discern
congressional intent to create a private right of action when the statute ex-
plicitly protects a specified class of persons than when the statute arguably only
offers a form of financial assistance. Id. at 932. However, the court concluded
that it was at least arguable that Congress intended to protect the narrow class
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litigants in CETA,1s9 there was not sufficient evidence of congressional
intent to infer a private cause of action.190
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Taylor v. Brighton Corp.,191 was
faced with the question of whether section 11(c) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 192 impliedly creates a private cause of
action in favor of an employee allegedly discharged in retaliation for
reporting OSHA safety violations. 93
The court took note of the four-factor test of Cort, but emphasized
that the factors are only a "signpost" that guide the most central in-
quiry - the intent of Congress. 94 Beginning with a review of the
language of the statute, the court noted that while Congress had pro-
vided an express administrative remedy, it was silent as to a private
judicial remedy. 195 Further, the court read the legislative history as
189. Id. at 933-34. Section 106(b) of CETA allows aggrieved persons to
file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor for an alleged violation of the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 816(b) (1976). The Secretary must conduct an investigation
and render a decision not later than 120 days from receiving the complaint. Id.
Under § 106(c)(2)(G), the Secretary is empowered to terminate the funding of
the program sponsor. Id. § 816(c)(2)(G). The Secretary also has authority to
terminate the financial assistance of any other recipient of funds, id. § 816(d)(1),
or to withhold funds otherwise payable in order to recover any amounts ex-
pended in violation of the Act. Id. § 8 16 (g). See 617 F.2d at 930.
190. 617 F.2d at 933-34. The court first noted that when a statute pro-
vides for specified remedies, the courts should not expand the statute's coverage
to subsume other remedies, at least in circumstances where the express adminis-
trative remedies provide relief for the specific claims of the plaintiff. Id. at 933
8c n.5. Next, the court observed that Congress had placed significant reliance
on the ability and expertise of the Secretary of Labor, as his unique perspective
on the area enables him to balance the various elements of the program in the
interest of the various recipients and participants. Id. at 933. To the court.
these factors indicated that Congress intended its administrative enforcement
scheme to be the exclusive remedy under the Act. Id. at 934.
191. 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980).
192. 29 U.S.C. §660(c) (1976). Section ll(c)(1) prohibits the retaliatory
discharge of or discrimination against any employee who reports OSHA viola-
tions of the employer. Id. §660(c)(1). Section 11(c)(2) gives complaining
employees an express private administrative remedy for violations of § 11(c)(1)
in the form of a complaint to the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 660(c)(2). The
Secretary must investigate all complaints and must institute judicial action to
force compliance with the Act on behalf of all meritorious claimants. Id.
193. 616 F.2d at 257. The plaintiffs alleged that they were wrongfully dis-
charged from the employ of the defendant in retaliation for reporting safety
violations to OSHA or for opposing the company's retaliatory and discrimina-
tory treatment of other such employees. Id.
194. Id. at 258-59. See also Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 234 (3d Cir.
1980) (Cort factors are merely "guideposts" for the determination of intent);
Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177 (6th Cir. 1979) ("central in-
quiry" is congressional intent to create a private remedy).
195. 616 F.2d at 259. The court noted that "in view of the express pro-
visions for enforcing the [statutory prohibition], it is highly improbable that
'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action.'" Id.,
quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 20. See
also Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170, 1177 (6th Cir. 1979) ("Where
Congress has provided a specific provision, the court should not expand the
remedy beyond the limits where Congress was prepared to go").
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suggesting that Congress intended to make the administrative enforce-
ment provisions the exclusive statutory remedy. 196 Given this expression
of intent, the court declined to recognize the existence of an implied
private cause of action.197
B. Decisions of the Courts of Appeals Reflecting Resistance to the
Modification of the Cort Test
The Second Circuit recently held, in Leist v. Simplot,9 8 that, in
certain circumstances, it will not follow the restrictive trend of Touche
Ross and Transamerica.199
In Leist, the plaintiffs were traders in the commodities futures
market who brought suit against other traders, the New York Mercantile
Exchange, and certain brokers for damages allegedly suffered as a result
of the defendants' manipulation of the market which resulted in a huge
default in the delivery of certain commodities contracts. 200 Claims were
brought under various sections of the Commodities Exchange Act
196. 616 F.2d at 259-63. The court noted that as the retaliatory discharge
provision proceeded through Congress, it was amended on several occasions.
Id. at 259-61. The purpose for the changes, the court noted, was to provide a
mechanism which would enable the Secretary to screen out frivolous complaints
so as not to overburden the courts. Id. at 261. Given this congressional pur-
pose, the court stated that an implied private cause of action would be incon-
sistent with the express statutory remedies, saying: "We conclude it to be
unlikely that Congress, having deliberately interposed the Secretary's investiga-
tion as a screening mechanism between complaining employees and the district
courts, intended to permit those employees whose claims are screened out to
file individual actions in those same courts." Id. at 262.
197. Id. at 264. Interestingly, in Taylor, the Secretary of Labor filed an
amicus brief urging the recognition of an implied private remedy because he
had neither the personnel nor the resources to handle all the claims brought
under § 11(c). Id. at 263. The court rejected this argument, noting that the
Secretary "should address his argument to Congress, not the courts." Id. at
264. The court reiterated that the "dispositive question" is not whether it is
desirable to recognize an implied private cause of action, but whether Congress
intended to provide one. Id.
198. 638 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980).
199. But see CETA Workers' Organizing Comm. v. City of New York, 617
F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1980), discussed at notes 181-90 and accompanying text supra.
200. 638 F.2d at 288-92. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendant-traders, along with many co-conspirators, engaged in a conspiracy to
depress the price of the May 1976 Maine potato futures contract traded on the
floor of the New York Mercantile Exchange. Id. at 289. The defendant-
brokers through which the conspirators operated were alleged to have con-
tributed to the damage suffered by the plaintiffs because they knew or should
have known the contracts they purchased for them could not be delivered, and
were purchased only for the purpose of unlawful price manipulation. Id. at
289-90. The New York Mercantile Exchange was included as a defendant
based on its allegedly negligent failure to maintain an orderly market and its
failure to report the various violations of the Act alleged by the plaintiffs. Id.
at 290. It is important to note that none of the defendants stood in a broker-
customer relation with the plaintiffs, nor was there any allegation of fraud or
manipulation with regard to the plaintiffs' accounts. See id. at 300-01.
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(CEA),201 which contains no express private right of action for violation
of its provisions.2 02 Thus, the Second Circuit was faced with the issue
of whether an implied private cause of action should be recognized in
favor of traders on the commodities futures market under the CEA.203
The court began its analysis by noting that prior to the 1974 amend-
ments to the CEA, there was widespread judicial recognition of an im-
plied remedy under the CEA.204 Consequently, the court did not frame
the issue as whether Congress intended to create an implied cause of
action when it enacted the CEA,205 but rather whether in 1974, when it
201. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-19 (1976). The specific sections relied on by the plain-
tiffs included §§ 4b, 9(b), 5(d) & 5a(8) of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 13(b), 7(d) &
7a(8) (1976).
202. 638 F.2d at 303.
203. Id. at 302.
204. Id. at 296-302. The majority noted that in many of the statutes ad-
ministered by the SEC, there were extensive administrative reparations pro-
cedures provided in the statute. Id. at 297. Arguments that these procedures
were intended by Congress to be the exclusive means of enforcement of the
Act were rejected in many of the pre-1974 cases. Id. at 297-98. See, e.g., Dann
v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 208-09 (6th Cir. 1961); Fratt v.
Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1953); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d
422, 426-27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Baird v. Franklin, 141
F.2d 238, 244-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). Further, the Leist
majority emphasized that the Supreme Court had sanctioned the implication
doctrine in several cases, including Rigsby and Borak. 638 F.2d at 298-99. For
a discussion of the Rigsby decision, see notes 12-18 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the Borak decision, see notes 19-30 and accom-
panying text supra.
For this reason, the court did not find it surprising that there was a long
line of cases under the pre-1974 CEA which recognized an implied private cause
of action. 638 F.2d at 299-300. See, e.g., Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber & Co., 479
F.2d 529, 534 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Chicago Mercantile
Exchange v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973) (per curiam); Booth v. Peavey Co.
Commodity Services, 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970); Seligson v. New York
Produce Exchange, 378 F. Supp. 1076, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom.
Miller v. New York Produce Exchange, 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 823 (1977).
The majority noted that most of these decisions involved fraud by a broker
on his customers, but that one case, the Deaktor decision, did not involve fraud.
638 F.2d at 300. The dissent pointed out that the Deaktor case was the only
decision to allow a private cause of action by a trader against an exchange. Id.
at 324 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Further, the Supreme Court had never ruled
on the implication of a private action under the Act, and the remainder of
the pre-1974 decisions involved the existence of fraud in the customer-dealer
relationship. Id. In Judge Mansfield's view, because neither Deaktor nor any
of the other pre-1974 decisions were ever cited to or relied on by Congress, "to
presume ... that Congress was aware of and approved these prior cases is to
substitute sheer speculation for hard evidence of intent." Id. The majority
disagreed with the dissent's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence that
Congress had been aware of the pre-1974 cases, saying that such an assertion
"seriously underrates the expertise of our lawmakers and their staffs in subjects
of particular concern to them." Id. at 301. The majority did recognize, how-
ever, that the lower courts have been split as to whether there should be a
continued recognition of an implied private cause of action after the 1974
Amendments. Id. at 302 & n.19.
205. 638 F.2d at 303. The court termed the existence of the pre-1974
cases and Congress' failure to expressly disapprove of them as a "differentiating
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amended the CEA, Congress was justified in assuming that the courts
would continue to find a private cause of action.206
To determine whether a continuing implied cause of action should
be recognized, the court used the four-factor test of Cort.207  The court
factor of . . . transcendent importance." Id. Thus, the question was not
whether Congress intended to create a new right of action in 1974, but rather
whether it intended, sub silentio, to legislatively overrule all the cases which
had previously recognized one. Id. The court emphasized that whether rightly
or wrongly decided under recent Supreme Court decisions, the pre-1974 cases
had uniformly recognized an implied action, and thus the burden was placed
on the defendant to show that Congress intended to change the existing law.
Id.
The court also examined the significance of Touche Ross and Transamerica
and their impact on the decision in this case. Id. at 316-17. The court em-
phasized that even assuming arguendo that the rationale of Touche Ross and
Transamerica would deny the recognition of a private remedy if the statute
were enacted after those decisions, Congress had taken no steps to expressly
disapprove the unanimous course of cases which had recognized private dam-
age actions under the CEA, which in turn, were based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Borak. Id. at 317. Even if Borak should now be presumed to be
wrongly decided, the court reasoned, there is no basis to assert that, in 1974,
Congress knew that such a drastic change in the Court's thinking would be
forthcoming. Id. Thus, without an explicit showing of intent to change what
Congress knew to be the law, the court concluded that a private cause of
action should be continued. Id.
The dissent chided the majority for reaching this conclusion because re-
cent Supreme Court decisions have made clear that the pre-1974 decisions were
erroneous, as they were based on a tort theory rather than congressional intent.
Id. at 356 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that it was "un-
reasonable to assume that Congress . . . intended to compound the error by
tacitly giving effect to them." Id.
206. Id. at 303. In this regard, the court called attention to the canon
of construction that "the reenactment of a statute incorporates preceding judi-
cial interpretations." Id. at 310, quoting VanVranken v. Helvering, 115 F.2d
709, 710 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 585 (1941). In his dissent,
Judge Mansfield asserted that the majority's framing of the issue so as to put
the burden of proof on the defendant to show congressional intent to ter-
minate an existing cause of action "puts the cart before the horse." 638 F.2d
at 340 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). He emphasized that the proper matter to
be resolved is whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action,
not whether Congress intended to destroy such a pre-existing right, which
assumes the matter in controversy. Id. Judge Mansfield stated: "Where, as
here, Congress has expressly provided for judicial and administrative means
of enforcement, the burden is on the plaintiffs to show a clear and affirmative
congressional intent to approve a private right of action, not on Congress or
defendants to show that the remedies provided by it are exclusive." Id.
207. 638 F.2d at 302-22. The court noted that Touche Ross directed that
the basic inquiry is into congressional intent and that Cort is simply helpful
to the determination. Id. at 302 n.20. The court then embarked on a step-
by-step analysis using the four prongs of the Cort test. Id. at 302-22. The
majority concluded that all four of the Cort factors favored implication, and
so recognized an implied private remedy in favor of the injured traders. Id.
at 322.
The dissent took issue with the majority's adherence to the Cort four-
factor analysis. Id. at 324-25 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield
asserted that, under the Supreme Court's decisions in Touche Ross and Trans.
america, courts are instructed to "look principally to the language and struc-
ture of the statute at issue . . . rather than engage in judicial legislation
supported only by our own view that a private suit would be a salutary enforce-
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concluded that it is irrelevant whether, under the present Supreme Court
decisions, the pre-1974 cases were decided rightly or wrongly.2 0s In-
stead, the court considered the pre-1974 decisions relevant to the issue
of congressional intent since Congress presumably knew of them and
expressed no intention to change them.209 In the absence of such an
intent, the court concluded that the existence of an implied remedy
under the CEA should be continued.21 0
The Third Circuit, in Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust
Co.,211 exhibited a continuing fidelity to the Cort test, even when con-
struing a regulatory statute such as those in issue in Touche Ross and
Transamerica. In Zefliro, the plaintiffs, the holders of debentures which
were issued under a trust indenture which named the defendant as
trustee, alleged that the defendant had failed to carry out certain duties
ment weapon." Id. at 325 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). From this the dissent
concluded that if the language and structure of the statute provide clear evi-
dence of congressional intent, the inquiry need go no further. Id. Only if
such evidence is not provided does the four-factor Cort analysis become rele-
vant. Id. Finding that the administrative procedures expressly provided by
the statute evidenced a congressional determination that such proceedings, and
not private judicial remedies, were the most effective way to monitor and
control the commodities futures market, Judge Mansfield concluded that the
language and structure of the statute gave clear evidence that Congress did
not intend to create a private judicial remedy. Id. at 347 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting).
208. Id. at 317. The majority reasoned that, unlike the congressional ac-
tion in 1974 at issue in this case, the congressional actions in 1934 and 1940
under review in Touche Ross and Transamerica were not taken against a
background of widespread judicial recognition of implied causes of action
either as a general matter or with respect to the specific statutes in issue in
those cases. Id.
209. Id. at 317. The court recognized that the 1974 amendments to the
CEA created an extensive and comprehensive "reparations" administrative
procedure to provide money damages to investors damaged by violations of the
CEA. Id. at 312. The court rejected, however, the principle of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius which was adopted by both the Touche Ross and
Transamerica Courts. Id. at 313.
In his dissent, Judge Mansfield chided the majority for its refusal to recog-
nize that the express administrative remedies provided in the CEA were exclu-
sive, based on his assertion that where it is claimed that Congress has created
a private action for damages which could result in civil liability for hundreds of
millions of dollars, primary weight should be placed on the language of the
statute or, at the very least, on unequivocal statements by those responsible
for its enactment. Id. at 327 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 322-23. The court asserted that "the rumors about the death
of the implied private cause of action ... are exaggerated, at least as far as
previously enacted statutes are concerned." Id. at 316. The majority opined
that the effect of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Touche Ross and
Transamerica is simply to emphasize that congressional intent is the ultimate
issue and not judicial notice of what would constitute sound policy, but failed
to note any effect that those decisions might have had on the Cort test. Id.
See also Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216 (6th Cir. 1980).
211. 623 F.2d 290 (3d Cir. 1980).
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imposed on it by the indenture 2 12 which were required by the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA),213 and sought to recover damages. 214 The
Court noted that the TIA gives no express private cause of action for
damages, 21 5 and stated that in view of the Supreme Court's recent de-
cisions in Touche Ross and Transamerica, its task was to determine
whether Congress intended to create the implied private damage action
asserted by the plaintiffs. 2
16
In the majority's view, the Cort test, while not wholly dispositive
of the issue, provided the "lodestar for guiding a court in determining
legislative intent." 217 Finding each of the four elements of the Cort
212. Id. at 292. In particular, the plaintiff contended that the defendant
failed to segregate certain assets; failed to transmit certain reports to debenture
holders and made misleading statements in the reports it did transmit; and
failed to disqualify itself when a conflict of interest arose between it and the
debenture holders. Id. at 292 n.l. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77kkk(a), 77mmm &
77jjj(b) (1976).
213. 623 F.2d at 292-93. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976). The TIA
is designed to protect investors by prescribing the terms of the indenture
agreement between the issuer and the indenture trustee. The TIA operates
by: 1) requiring that all indentures contain certain clauses which place the
indenture trustee in a fiduciary position vis-a-vis the security holders; 2) pro-
hibiting the use of indenture clauses which would relieve or exculpate the
trustee from liability for breach of his fiduciary duties; and 3) allowing the
use of indenture clauses which release the trustee from liability except for
non-performance of his required fiduciary duties. See id. §§ 77jjj-77rrr. Before
an indenture agreement can become effective, it must be "qualified" by ob-
taining SEC approval. A trust indenture becomes "qualified" after the se-
curity to which it relates has been properly registered, the trustee has been
approved by the SEC, and the indenture has been found to comply with the
requirements of §§ 77jjj-77rrr. Id. § 77iii. See id. §§ 77jjj-77rrr. Neither
the SEC nor the debenture holder, however, is given an express right to sue
in federal court to force compliance with the terms of the indenture by the
trustee. 623 F.2d at 293-94. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976).
214. 623 F.2d at 292. The defendant contended that the TIA does not
expressly provide for a federal cause of action and, therefore, that the de-
benture holders' suit must be brought in state court. Id. The plaintiffs
contended that the TIA contained an implied private damage action in favor
of debenture holders for breach of those provisions of a trust indenture
which are mandated by the TIA. Id.
215. Id. at 294-96. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1976).
216. 623 F.2d at 296. See also Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248,
255 (3d Cir. 1980); National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 615
F.2d 1222, 1229 (3d Cir. 1980).
217. 623 F.2d at 296. The court noted that the Cort test was basically
one of statutory construction and further noted that both Touche Ross and
Transamerica made clear that the ultimate determination was the intent of
Congress. Id. The court then observed that in Cannon, the Court had noted
that the fact that Congress failed to consider a private remedy was not neces-
sarily inconsistent with an intent to imply one. Id. Thus, the court con-
cluded, the Cort test was the proper analysis to be used for the determination
of congressional intent. Id.
It is submitted that the court's conclusion regarding the use of the Cort
test reflects an inadequate application of the principles announced in Touche
Ross and Transamerica. The court itself noted the restrictive attitude em-
bodied in these decisions, but failed to note any modification in the Cort test
occasioned by these cases. See id. at 294 & n.20.
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test to weigh in favor of the implication of a private cause of action in
this case,218 the court concluded that such an action should be recognized
in favor of injured debenture holders.219
The Seventh Circuit, in Bratton v. Shiffrin,220 was asked to recognize
an implied cause of action in favor of an air traveller who alleged that
his charter carrier failed to comply with certain Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB) security regulations. 22' On remand for reconsideration in light
of Touche Ross,222 the court began its analysis by stating that the latter
decision had been based upon the Supreme Court's application of the
Cort analysis. 223 Applying that analysis to the statute at issue, the court
concluded that although legislative history was sparse concerning an in-
tent to create a private remedy and the statute was silent on the point,22 4
218. Id. at 296-301. The court first concluded that the plain language of
the statute made it clear that debenture holders are the special beneficiaries
of the TIA. Id. at 296-97. In its examination of the legislative history of
the TIA, the court noted that Congress did not explicitly deal with the ability
of debenture holders to sue in federal court. Id. at 297. However, the legis-
lative history did provide evidence that Congress intended to allow investors
to sue on the indenture contract and, because this was a federally-created right,
concluded that the federal courts were the proper forum. Id. at 297-98. In
examining the third Cort factor, the court concluded that an implied federal
remedy was "necessary to effectuate purposes of the Act," or was, at the very
least, "helpful" to the effectuation of congressional intent. Id. at 300. Finally,
the court concluded that Congress intended to deal with the problem of the
regulation of trust indentures on a national scale. Id. at 301. Further, ob-
serving that any action regarding the indenture would concern the meaning
of the Act, not the intent of the parties as in a normal contract suit, the
court concluded that the subject matter in issue was not one traditionally
relegated to state law. Id.
219. Id. at 301. Judge Layton, of the District of Delaware, sitting by
designation, noted in his dissent that the majority applied a mechanical ap-
proach to the Cort four-factor test, which ignores a "basic question" - the
effect of Touche Ross on Cort. Id. at 302 (Layton, J., dissenting). Consid-
ering the evidence examined by the court to be ambiguous and inconclusive,
and "in light of the apparent intention of the Supreme Court to limit sharply
the doctrine of implication," the dissent disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion as to the existence of congressional intent to create a private cause of
action. Id. at 302-03 (Layton, J., dissenting).
220. 15 Av. Cas. 18,076 (7th Cir. 1980).
221. Id. at 18,076. The CAB regulations at issue were promulgated pur-
suant to § 401(n)(2) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(n)(2) (1976).
Cf. Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980), discussed at notes
165-80 and accompanying text supra.
222. 15 Av. Cas. at 18,076.
223. See id. The court also indicated that the Supreme Court in Touche
Ross "reaffirmed that the four indicia identified in Cort are useful guides to
determining whether or not a private right of action exists." Id. at 18,079.
It is submitted that the Bratton court misread the Supreme Court's decision in
Touche Ross, as the Court clearly did not use the four-factor analysis of Cort
in their examination of the statute at issue, but rather modified the Cort test.
For a discussion of Touche Ross, see notes 97-114 and accompanying text supra.
224. 15 Av. Cas. at 18,077. The court pointed to only one statement
made by a witness before a Senate subcommittee which indicated that the
security provisions, which required that charter carriers be bonded, were de-
signed to provide some recourse to previously helpless air travellers. Id. The
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the congressional silence provided an affirmative indication of Congress'
intent to create such an implied cause of action.225
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Chumney v. Nixon,226 was faced with
the issue of whether section 113 of the Federal Aviation Act 227 contained
an implied cause of action in favor of an air passenger who was the
victim of a simple assault by another passenger.228 The Court began
its analysis by noting Touche Ross and Transamerica, and stated that
in those cases the Supreme Court had followed and emphasized the Cort
test.22 9 Applying this test to the statute in issue, the Court recognized
the existence of a private cause of action implicit in section 113.230
IV. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
The decisions of the Supreme Court in the Touche Ross and Trans-
america cases 231 have sent an explicit message to the lower courts that
court failed to note, however, whether Congress intended air travellers to have
a right to recover from the bonding company only or against charter carriers
who fail to comply with the CAB regulations by failing to procure the bond.
See id. at 18,079-80 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 18,077. Judge Bauer, in dissent, pointed out that the majority
decision represents a misapplication of Touche Ross, which in his opinion, was
dispositive of the issue. Id. at 18,079 (Bauer, J., dissenting). Because §401
(n)(2) neither prohibits conduct nor creates private rights in favor of any class
of persons, Judge Bauer reasoned that Touche Ross clearly counsels that an
implied private remedy should not be recognized. Id. at 18,078-79 (Bauer, J.,
dissenting).
226. 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980).
227. 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1976). Section 113 expressly makes criminal all as-
saults which occur on any aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States. Id. The Chumney court noted that this section was enacted in
order to prevent airplane hijackings. 615 F.2d at 395.
228. 615 F.2d at 390. The plaintiff claimed that while he was a passenger
on board a charter flight from Rio de Janiero to Memphis, he was assaulted by
the defendant and others, who broke some of his teeth and caused him to suffer
serious, and possibly permanent, injuries. Id.
229. Id. at 394. Although the court cited both Touche Ross and Trans-
america in noting that the Supreme Court had recently spoken on the impli-
cation question, the court made no further mention of these decisions. Id. at
393. Rather, the court cited Cannon for the proposition that courts are em-
powered to recognize an implied private action when none is explicitly au-
thorized in the statute. Id. at 393-94. Then, the court simply concluded that
the recent cases had "repeatedly followed and emphasized" Cort. Id. at 394.
It is submitted that in reaching this conclusion, the court ignored the restric-
tions placed upon the use of the Cort test which are evident in both Touche
Ross and Transamerica. For a discussion of these decisions, see notes 97-150
and accompanying text supra.
230. 615 F.2d at 394. The court first concluded that air passengers were
the special beneficiaries of § 113. Id. The court then noted that although the
legislative history was silent concerning private civil remedies, Congress had
clearly intended to enact comprehensive legislation designed to protect the
safety of passengers flying in the aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. Id.
Thus, the court concluded that a civil action for damages would be consistent
with the overall purpose, and should be inferred therefrom. Id.
231. For a discussion of Touche Ross and Transamerica, see notes 97-150
and accompanying text supra.
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in an examination of a statute in order to determine whether it con-
tains an implied private cause of action, only one relevant determination
need be made - the intent of Congress when it enacted the statute.23 2
Although the lower courts have almost uniformly accepted this as their
task,233 they have adopted widely divergent methods of analysis, some
adhering to the four-factor Cort test as "evidence" of this intent 234 and
some using a more restricted analysis which more closely comports with
the examination of statutory language and legislative history undertaken
by the Court in Touche Ross and Transamerica.23 5
The Supreme Court's decisions in Touche Ross and Transamerica
indicate that an examination of the language of the statute and its
legislative history are the most important tools in the task of the deter-
mination of congressional intent.23 6 In utilizing those tools, the courts
have examined several factors, a summary of which may serve as an
indication of the factors to which courts will, or should, look in future
implication cases.
A. The Examination of Statutory Language
Because any statutory provision being examined to determine
whether it contains an implied cause of action will not, of course, con-
tain an express cause of action, the language of the statute must be
examined for indications of an unarticulated congressional intent to
create a private remedy. Under Touche Ross, whenever the language
of the statute creates no rights in an identifiable class or proscribes no
conduct as unlawful, that fact is an important factor weighing against
implication.2 37 However, as Transamerica illustrates, even when the
language of the statute does create rights or proscribe conduct, that
fact alone does not automatically weigh in favor of implication.23 8
232. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 15-16;
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 568; notes 102 & 122 and accom-
panying text supra.
233. See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 303; Zeffiro v. First Pa. Banking
& Trust Co., 623 F.2d at 296; Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d at 680;
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1078 & n.4; Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616
F.2d at 258-59.
234. See, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 303-22; Zeffiro v. First Pa. Bank-
ing & Trust Co., 623 F.2d at 296; Chumney v. Nixon, 615 F.2d at 394. For a
discussion of Cort, see notes 44-59 and accompanying text supra.
235. See, e.g., Jablon v. Dean Witter ge Co., 614 F.2d at 679; Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1079-85; Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d at
259-63. For a discussion of Touche Ross and Transamerica, see notes 97-150 and
accompanying text supra.
236. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 16-18;
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 568-69.
237. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 569.
238. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 24;
note 150 and accompanying text supra.
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Another important factor in the examination of the statutory lan-
guage is an evaluation of the statutory scheme as a whole, to determine
whether alternative remedies are expressly provided in the statute.23 9
Following the lead of Touche Ross, 240 several courts have refused to
recognize an implied private remedy where the statute contains express
judicial remedies, 241 administrative remedies, 242 or administrative en-
forcement provisions.243 If such remedies or procedures are present in
the statute, the court will often refuse to recognize an implied private
action, based on the assertion that when Congress intended certain
remedies to be allowed, they knew how to provide for them and did
so expressly.244
B. The Examination of Legislative History
Typically, the legislative history of a statute will be silent as to
congressional intent to create a private damage action, as was the case
in both Touche Ross245 and Transamerica.246 While the absence of
affirmative evidence of congressional intent does not favor the recog-
nition of an implied private action, it does not automatically undermine
the claim that one exists. 247
Two factors in an examination of legislative history have been
interpreted by the courts to weigh in favor of the implication of a
private cause of action. The first is an indication that the statute in
issue had been modelled after another statute which had been pre-
viously interpreted to contain an implied private right of action.248
The second is an amendment to a statute in which an implied private
239. See, e.g., CETA Workers' Organizing Comm. v. City of New York,
617 F.2d at 933-34; Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d at 681; Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1077-78; Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d at
259-63.
240. See Touche Ross 8c Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 572. See also Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 20 ("it is highly improba-
ble that Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention a private action").
241. See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d at 681.
242. See, e.g., CETA Workers' Organizing Comm. v. City of New York, 617
F.2d at 933-34; jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d at 681; Rogers v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1077-78.
243. See, e.g., CETA Workers' Organizing Comm. v. City of New York,
617 F.2d at 933-34; Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d at 681; Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1077-78; Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d at
259-63.
244. See, e.g., Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d at 681; Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1077-78; Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d at
259-63.
245. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 570-71.
246. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 18.
247. See id.; Touche Ross 8: Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 570-71; note
125 and accompanying text supra.
248. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 694-99.
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action had previously been recognized without an express disapproval
of the private remedy. 249 It is important to note, however, that these
two factors should no longer favor implication in any statute enacted
after the Touche Ross and Transamerica decisions,250 as these cases
have put Congress on notice that the courts will no longer be liberal in
their recognition of implied causes of action and that if it is desired
that private litigants should have judicial remedies, they should be
expressly provided.251
V. CONCLUSION
As can be seen by the cases discussed above, the recognition of an
implied private cause of action is often as much an exercise in the
consistent application of precedent as it is a product of the struggle
within the individual judge between the policy of interpretive con-
sistency and the attempt to do justice in the particular case before him.
In this respect, the implied private cause of action can sometimes be a
valuable tool to further the ends of justice. Its use, however, must be
tempered and, moreover, it must be consonant with the notion that
the decision on the proper method to enhance the public interest is the
role of the legislature, not the courts. 25 2
Though this problem may be a continual one because of the many
pressures on Congress to be purposely vague,253 the desire to do justice
in a particular case must be tempered to avoid the temptation, in the
name of statutory interpretation, to step over the line into the realm
of judicial legislation.
249. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 317; notes 204-10 and accompanying
text supra.
250. See Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d at 317; note 205 and accompanying
text supra.
251. See, e.g., CETA Workers' Organizing Comm. v. City of New York,
617 F.2d at 932 &c n.2; Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d at 679; Rogers v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1077-78; Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d at
258-59.
252. See, e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d at 1085; Taylor v. Brighton
Corp., 616 F.2d at 264. As was expressed by Justice Powell in Cannon, when a
court oversteps its bounds and ventures into judicial legislation, it violates the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. See Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). For an interesting proposal
dealing with implication and its limitation using the "federal common law"
power, the doctrine of federalism and the doctrine of separation of powers, see
Comment, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction or
the Federal Common-Law Power?, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 355 (1980).
253. See note 163 supra; Steinberg, supra note 71 at 51. Further, a court
should realize that by recognizing a private cause of action where there was no
intent to create one, it is doing more than simply extending the remedial reach
of an existing statute - it is making law. It is creating a new action, and in
doing so, must define its scope, its elements and its defenses. See Glus v. G.C.
Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 259-68 (3d Cir. 1980) (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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COMMENTS
As the implication doctrine has evolved over the years, the trend
has swung from a very liberal judicial attitude toward implication 254
to a much more restrictive outlook, as evidenced by the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Touche Ross and Transamerica.255
The response of the lower federal courts to the new restrictive
trend has been far from uniform. 250 For this reason, an approach has
been suggested under which the courts would search for congressional
intent by looking at only two factors - statutory language and legis-
lative history.25 7  It is hoped that by using such an analysis, two
important policies will be served- consistency within the judiciary and
consistency of application of federal statutes in accordance with the
intent of Congress.
James J. Spadaro, Jr.
254. For a discussion of early implication cases, see notes 12-39 and accom-
panying text supra.
255. For a discussion of Touche Ross and Transamerica, see notes 97-150
and accompanying text supra.
256. For a discussion of recent decisions of the courts of appeals after
Touche and Transamerica, see notes 155-230 and accompanying text supra.
257. For a proposed analysis to be used in future implication cases, see
notes 231-51 and accompanying text supra.
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